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          Simplifying network security data to the point that it is readily accessible and 
usable by a wider audience is increasingly becoming important, as networks become 
larger and security conditions and threats become more dynamic and complex, requiring 
a broader and more varied security staff makeup. With the need for a simple metric to 
quantify the security level on a network, this thesis proposes: simplify a network’s 
security risk level into a simple metric. Methods for this simplification of an entire 
network’s security level are conducted on several characteristic networks. Identification 
of computer network port vulnerabilities from NIST’s Network Vulnerability Database 
(NVD) are conducted, and via utilization of NVD’s Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System values, composite scores are created for each computer on the network, and then 
collectively a composite score is computed for the entire network, which accurately 
represents the health of the entire network. Special concerns about small numbers of 
highly vulnerable computers or especially critical members of the network are 
confronted. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Computer security becomes more important every day. With more and more 
critical assets being digital information stored on computers, transmitted across networks 
of computers, and available for access remotely, the number of ways that criminals can 
steal, modify, or destroy data are ever increasing [1].With this rising concern and focus 
on computer security, many administrators are looking to begin security auditing on their 
networks, and to maintain a security policy that helps them protect their assets. 
Identifying the condition of a network in order to remediate the security vulnerabilities it 
has, is a major task.  
 How to be informational about the security level of a network without describing 
the network in its entirety? Likewise, how can someone without extensive technical skill 
understand the report, and thereby have an understanding of the network security? Is 
there a way to simplify this security condition or report into an understandable form? 
This is the problem propose to solve. By simplifying network security into a quantified, 
simple value, effectively more information is gained from the reduction, in that the 
information is usable more readily, easily comparable, and reachable by a wider 
audience. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
 Simplifying network security reports to a point where they reach a wider 
audience, and are easier to understand will ultimately increase the security level in 
computer networks. An increased understanding of the network security condition is 
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necessary, in that currently network security reports are verbose and difficult to 
understand. Security experts agree that long, complicated network security reports are 
generally ignored by administration and clients, so reports must be concise and readable 
by the target audience (not the security experts conducting the security reviews) [9]. 
Network security reports are not much use if there is no one capable of digesting them 
and producing a response to the current security condition. Increasing computer security 
rests on better informing those in a position to make a difference, and enhance security on 
the system. Pursuant to this goal of making network security conditions on a computer 
network understandable by a wider audience, and in order to make network security 
quantifiable, thereby making the information applicable to more mathematical models, 
this research proposes to quantify the network security condition in to a simple metric. 
By simplifying this information into a usable state, the network security report will be 
more understandable, in a standard form, and thereby utilizable by administration, or 
network technicians, in order to remediate the problems on their network. More usable 
information in the hands of network administrators will enable networks to be more 
secure, in that a better understanding of the security “health” of the network will be 
imparted, enabling action to be taken if needed. 
 
1.2 Goals 
 
 This research aims to simplify computer network security reports into a single 
scored metric, which gives a very accurate idea of just how secure a collection of 
machines on a computer network are. This metric will reflect the entire network’s 
security, as well as individual machines having an impact on the score. The score will 
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properly reflect the level of security on the sample characteristic networks that the 
experiments will operate upon in this research. Generating a simple, quantified metric for 
network security could also enable integration of this method into future quantitative 
network security work. 
 This research’s approach is quantifying network security by first getting the 
condition of the network, and then determining scores for its members, ultimately 
generating a composite score for the entire network. Obtaining a network condition is 
done by reading in a network condition, something similar to a network security scan, 
and using this as a representation of the network. The network condition is then matched 
against a list of known security vulnerabilities to scan for the signature of on the 
network’s member machines. The presence of these vulnerabilities is determined by 
matching the network condition to the vulnerability signatures in a well-known security 
vulnerability database. A composite score for the entire network is then generated by first 
scoring each machine on the network, and then combining the scores for all the machines 
on the network into one composite score, via algorithms discussed later. 
 
1.3 Overview 
 
 After the abstract, motivation, and goals of this research have been discussed in 
chapter 1, the remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides the background for computer security through an overview of 
the common problems, the scale of risk by computer security vulnerabilities and solutions 
to computer and network security. Chapter 3 discusses the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology’s National Vulnerability Database and its related components. 
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Discussion of its scoring system, CVSS, is also included. This database and the scoring 
system are utilized within the thesis work to provide a foundation of nationally accredited 
scores for network vulnerabilities, to which the thesis expands to the machine and then 
network level in order to get composite scores at these respective levels. 
 The main work of the thesis, the research towards simplification via quantification 
is presented in chapter 4. A few different approaches to the quantification of the network 
security report are demonstrated and compared. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation 
of the proposed algorithms and framework for quantifying the network. Chapter 6 
explores the experimental paradigm to confirm the performance of the quantification 
algorithms. Comparison of the scores from the proposed compositing methods will be 
provided. Finally, chapter 7 discusses the efficacy of the proposed methods employed to 
quantify the network and suggests future work which goes beyond this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
 Computer security is concerned with the protection and assurance of digital 
information. The protection of computers containing information via isolation from real 
and potential threats, and the confirmation that the data is not compromised through 
unknown threats is the goal. This security must be achieved while users and systems are 
undisturbed and business continues as normal, though; a security system has failed if the 
data to be protected is cut off from those whom it is intended for. The classic security 
mantra of maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability (the CIA Triad as shown 
in Figure 2.1 [36]) are what computer security marches on. 
 
Figure 2.1: The CIA Triad 
 
 
 Confidentiality is maintaining the secrecy of data which must not be allowed to be 
seen by all clients. Data which is secret or sensitive falls within this category. Nearly all 
computer data falls under this scope when concerned with threats external to a computer 
system, in that there are many ways to compromise a computer, with most concerned 
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with some information, which should be secret on a machine, such as passwords, system 
configuration, or system status. Major concerns with confidentiality are obvious things 
such as top secret documents, credit card information, and private records. Concerns over 
confidentiality are so strong today that many physicians will not even adopt modern 
digital medical records, due to concerns that the confidentiality of the data may be 
compromised, since this is a situation where near-absolute confidentiality needs to be 
assured [10]. Maintaining confidentiality is typically achieved via encryption of the data 
to be protected, in order to prevent access to the data, even if the data storage is breached 
by an attacker. Also, prevention of unauthorized access to computer systems is used in 
order to secure the data, in order to keep it from being copied or viewed. 
 Integrity of data must be maintained, meaning the data must be kept in its original 
form, unmodified, uncorrupted, and as stored. Data can not only be stolen, but it can be 
modified as well, and left in place. A classic example of this is to modify computer 
system passwords in order to create authorized access to systems by attackers, effectively 
creating their own logins, and free-reign on the system, particularly if the account is in an 
administrator role. Data stored on machines must also be protected from modification, to 
guarantee when it is accessed after being stored, it is true to its original form, and so 
malicious changes are not made to important information. Malicious code can also be 
inserted into seemingly legitimate software, modifying the software, potentially changing 
the functionality of the software, and perhaps disrupting the system and its data further. 
Some code modifications such as this have been known to cause complete data loss on 
systems through modification of operating systems [11]. Maintaining data integrity is 
necessary in order to ensure the data is as intended, and not changed by malicious parties. 
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 Availability must be maintained in order to keep the data which is protected by 
security, available to those whom are authorized to view or change the data. Security has 
failed if everyone is kept out, including those who should pass security. Striking the 
balance between securing the network too tightly, and thereby preventing legitimate 
access, and securing the network too lightly, and thereby allowing too great a chance of 
malicious access, is a difficult task. This balance is a major concern with computer 
security, particularly when concerned with security which operates on a continuum of 
security, such as computer firewall configuration, or network filter administration. Data 
becoming unavailable due to over-zealous security procedures is one of the most 
common failures of computer security today, particularly from client and users’ 
viewpoint [12]. Even if a computer system is never compromised in any way, clients are 
likely to have encountered cases where legitimate requests on their part for information 
were impeded or prevented due to such overbearing security procedures. The balance 
between data available to everyone and data available to no one is a continuum on which 
computer security administrators and experts must balance very carefully. 
 Network security is a growing concern with economies and global assets moving 
online, and becoming increasingly data-centric. In 2001, US-CERT (United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team) recognized 52,000 online computer security 
attacks; this increase in attacks was a 150% growth over the previous year [1]. Moving 
data online allows greater freedom of information, inherently increasing the ease of 
access to the information. These are desirable in general, but with intended access, there 
are created unintended avenues of access which allow those whom are not allowed to 
read/modify/delete the information to do just that. Preventing the unlawful and 
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unintended viewing, recording, modification, or even removal of data is of paramount 
importance, particularly when these assets are becoming increasingly the backbone of 
global economies, and military assets. 
 The cost of security breaches is truly great, with the cost of identity theft from 
data intrusions being in the billions in 2003 according to the Federal Trade Commission 
[3]. In order to protect these increasingly exposed assets, administrators must work to 
remove avenues of unlawful access to this data, in order to preserve its content. 
Discovering these methods of accessing the data unlawfully can be hard to detect, and are 
often built into the very systems that they use, albeit mostly on accident. Something so 
minor as some computer software which was not written as securely as it should have 
been can be the culprit for exposing data. Alternatively, misconfigured computers or 
network hardware can be the issue. These machines can have network access ports which 
allow malicious code, or intruders to infiltrate and access the machine in question, 
remotely. Data is then compromised through a variety of means. 
 The security of computer systems is increasingly important, as data becomes more 
important in the global economy, and as more data is made available. The availability of 
the data very often correlates directly with the level of vulnerability the data is subjected 
to. Once data is out and available, keeping it in the hands of only those that are supposed 
to have it is a great challenge. 
  
2.1 Computer Security 
 
 Computer security starts with understanding the types of vulnerabilities 
computers are subjected to. Computer security, for personal computers, is concerned 
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more often than not with eliminating methods of exterior access to your machine by other 
computers which intend to access your machine. Things such as open communication 
ports, misconfigured security measures from the machine’s operating system, or even 
improperly secured sharing settings, can leave a computer wide open to attackers to get 
data or otherwise compromise your machine. Many factors play together to make a 
machine vulnerable to attackers, but with proper maintenance and vulnerability counter-
measure, most security flaws can be counteracted, and sealed up to prevent any 
exploitation by attackers. 
 Securing a personal computer by keeping software updated with the latest version 
is one way to protect machines. Software vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered 
by security firms and software companies, which then enable the companies that produce 
the software to fix the problem. Fixing the problem removes the vulnerability, effectively 
eliminating the possibility of exploiting the computer via that avenue. Once the problem 
is fixed, a new patch or version of the software is created, which allows users to update 
the software on their computers, sealing this vulnerability. Without the patches, machines 
are left vulnerable to security vulnerabilities, waiting to be exploited. Also, with software 
constantly being updated with new functionality and features, the number of software 
vulnerabilities each machine possesses increases. A quantitative study of computer 
software security vulnerabilities shows that as operating systems and other software 
becomes more complex, the number of vulnerabilities will increase at a predictable rate 
[8]. With a significant rate of vulnerabilities being created all the time, continual patching 
of these vulnerabilities is necessary to close them off. The longer these vulnerabilities are 
left open, of course the greater chance of any individual machine being exploited via 
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these vulnerabilities. Additionally, as new vulnerabilities are discovered, they become 
more and more commonplace as tools of the trade for criminal agents to exploit one’s 
computers. Very common, powerful vulnerabilities which have been known for years can 
still be a threat, if one does not update their software after they install it. For example, a 
20-year old vulnerability known colloquially as the “ping of death,” was a Microsoft 
Windows vulnerability which allowed attackers to cause a buffer overflow, allowing the 
attacker to crash or gain access to the machine, depending on the content of the ping used 
in the attack. This was also exploited by some websites, which contained code which 
would automatically execute a ping of death attack on clients connecting to the site, 
which allowed websites to take control of personal computer machines very easily 
through gaining remote access to the machine, and saving the credentials for attackers 
who maintained the web server [4]. The vulnerability still affects all modern operating 
systems without applying the fix for it, and has affected them for years. 
 Personal computer software firewalls can protect vulnerable computers as well. 
This type of firewall differs from a network firewall device, in that it is a software 
firewall running on the machine itself, rather than filtering network traffic in-line. A 
firewall can be a dedicated network device, or a machine on the network, filtering traffic, 
or even just a piece of software on the individual machine, running in the background to 
protect it. A firewall is an application which scans incoming network traffic, and does not 
allow some of the traffic to pass. This in effect serves as a “fire wall” which keeps known 
bad traffic out, and allows only traffic which passes inspection by the firewall to pass. 
Firewalls help to stop exploitation of machines on the network, or on the machine 
running a software firewall, even before they begin. For example, the famous Slammer 
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worm which is commonly regarded as the fastest spreading computer worm, could 
exploit a machine with just one packet sent to UDP port 1434, exploiting SQL Server’s 
security vulnerability. Blocking traffic from all but trusted hosts that need to access 
SQL’s management functions was critical in preventing any further spread of the worm 
[7].  A common application of a firewall would be blocking traffic on a particular 
computer network port. Traffic to a port which is known to be exploited commonly, can 
be blocked entirely from entering the network, effectively eliminating the security 
vulnerability as an access avenue. Firewalls on personal machines can also be fine-tuned 
to the user’s needs. Not only can the network be filtered from the outside networks 
attempting to access it, but also the user can filter even the traffic which comes through to 
the user’sown specifications. Each port can be blocked in turn on your machine only, 
blocking traffic through a port entirely, or just for a specific application, etc., allowing 
your personal computer to be protected from internal network threats. An example for 
firewall is shown in Figure 2.2 [35]. 
Figure 2.2: Firewall Example 
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2.2 Network Security  
 
 Securing a computer network is somewhat similar to securing a personal 
computer, in that the desire is to eliminate access by unauthorized or otherwise 
undesirable agents. Access to a network is a two-part endeavor between two machines. A 
communication session typically is established between the two machines, which enable 
them to communicate, exchanging messages over some communication medium. 
Communication over most networks functions this way, and due to this, a major concern 
is removing the possibility of undesired communication channels being established 
between machines on the network, or accessing a machine on a network  from the 
outside.  
 Preventing these communications from occurring is the grand challenge for 
enforcing network security. Besides security on personal computers and other machines 
on the network, network administrators must attempt to stop content before it reaches 
clients on the network. The idea of many network security measure or technique is that 
network security is the first line of defense, eliminating as many threats as possible 
before communications reach clients’ machines, which are effectively the last line of 
defense against malicious agents communicating across the network. 
 One effective method of increasing the security in a network is to not allow 
malicious communication into the network at all, effectively stopping it at the “front 
door” of a network. Via network hardware which is in-line between the network being 
secured, and the wider network outside, such as the Internet, security can be enhanced. 
Network security devices, including network filters, spam boxes, firewalls, etc., are all 
intended to filter out content entering the network, which is not allowed based on the 
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security policy of the network. Security administrators and network administrators can 
configure these devices to block traffic selectively based on a set of rules which detail the 
“fingerprint” of the malicious or suspicious content as it attempts to be relayed into the 
network. These rules are based on such things as the content of the data, format, whether 
it’s encrypted or not, the communication port used, transmission protocol, point of origin, 
point of destination, etc. These rules, which are complicated to create, and can be difficult 
to “fine-tune” to being just-right, are the basis for the performance of most network 
security hardware. 
 The rules on these machines must be tuned to a level which is “just right.” This 
means that the rule prevents malicious activity on the network by blocking malicious 
traffic trying to enter the network, but also the rules must not prevent legitimate traffic 
from entering the network. If this occurs, the security appliances are preventing proper 
utilization of the network, which is undesirable, to say the least. Intuitively, a network 
perfectly secured from the outside world would be one in which no traffic is allowed in. 
This type of network would not have any malicious traffic incoming from the outside, but 
obviously it has issues. A network must allow traffic, or else it is useless, and one might 
as well just unplug from the wider networks.  On the other hand, a perfectly usable 
network would be one in which no traffic is prevented from entering the network. This 
allows the users the best freedom, since all traffic is allowed, and thereby no legitimate 
traffic is prevented from arriving at its destination. This type of network is a user’s utopia 
in concept, particularly if they are accustomed to strict network security rules, but as with 
the other paradigm, the security administrator’s utopia, this paradigm does not work in 
practice, since the entire network is exposed to all forms of attacks. Striking the balance 
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between these worlds is the challenge. Quantitative analysis of firewall configurations 
has found that as the complexity and quantity of the rules increase, the number of 
configuration errors there are, so getting them right, but not too complex is difficult [6]. 
Ensuring access to the network, while preventing malicious access is a fine balance, and a 
challenge which occupies network administrators. 
 
2.3 Impact of Security 
 
 Computer security is increasingly important with the move towards digital assets. 
As more and more companies are valued based on information they possess in digital 
form, or provision of digital services, the pressure to maintain security on these digital 
assets has increased. A security breach allowing access to digital information which is of 
a critical nature at a digital company can cost the company large amounts of money in 
lost market edge. Additionally, markets are very sensitive to security breaches more and 
more, as they receive widespread news coverage anymore. Even if a breach is found to 
have not revealed large amounts of information critical to the company, the damage may 
have already been done, in the form of market or trader panic, dropping the share price of 
publicly traded companies’ stocks [2]. 
 Besides the damage done from revealing confidential information which might be 
of strategic or intellectual value to the companies in question, many companies must 
protect their customers’ information as well. With the surge in online sales, with large 
online dealers dealing in huge numbers of customers, customers’ personal information, 
and even financial information is at risk if the company is exploited. Personal information 
such as names, addresses, other demographical information, social security numbers, can 
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be stolen, leading to the information being used to impersonate the person in financial 
transactions, leading to ruined credit, fraudulent purchases, etc., all based on the identity 
profiles which were stolen from a company which did not properly protect their 
customers’ data.  
 For example, Sony Computer Entertainment, maker of the popular computer 
gaming console series, the PlayStation, had their online gaming and entertainment service 
hacked in 2011. The attackers had access to, and presumably saved, 77 million users’ 
credit card data, used to subscribe to the service, or buy things through it. Despite Sony’s 
claim that the data was encrypted on their servers, and protected, it was stored un-
encrypted, and easily accessible through some of the system’s vulnerabilities. The result 
was that the popular console’s online service was offline for weeks, and much confidence 
was lost in Sony’s console and their security when handling customers’ sensitive data. 
Sony stated that the cost of the intrusion was approximately $171M [5]. 
 Stolen information is one large source of damage to businesses and organizations 
with networked data servers, but also one must be concerned with interruption of service. 
For retailers, especially those online, the more hours which your storefront is open the 
more sales you receive. Keeping online businesses accessible at all hours, on all days, all 
year long is of critical importance. Even a few minutes of downtime can cost large 
amounts of money from lost sales, not only from direct missed sales when customers try 
to access your site, and it is down, but also through second-hand missed sales from 
customers’ who lose confidence in your storefront since it has been “brought down” by 
attackers in the past. Keeping outside attackers from clogging your web servers with 
illegitimate communications requests, false users, or even clogging the network which 
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feeds into your personal network, is of paramount importance. Being able to recognize 
the difference between a high traffic load and an attack is also an important skill for 
administrators, in that the behavior can often be very similar.  
 Overall, security administrators must be able to keep confidential information 
secret, and out of attackers’ hands. Damage can not only be dealt to companies from lost 
technical or secret planning information, but also through loss of confidence, uncertainty 
about what information was lost, or even loss or revealing of customers’ information to 
attackers whom will very possibly use the information in identity theft style crimes. The 
continued protection of this confidential information, while keeping it available to those 
who need to access it across the network, is of utmost importance for network and 
security administrators. 
 
2.4 Security Auditing Software 
  
 Tools for scanning computers and computer networks for security risks exist 
fairly commonly today. Many network administrators, and especially computer security 
experts, must be able to get an idea of the condition of the network in order to remedy 
problems. Network scanning tools can provide detailed reports of the network conditions, 
vulnerabilities present, and sometimes what needs to be done for vulnerabilities based on 
certain databases which store the vulnerabilities and solutions. These reports list the 
vulnerabilities which appear, and which host they appear on. The tools described below 
are some of the most popular tools currently developed, and represent a cross-section of 
the vulnerability scanning software field.  
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2.4.1 Metasploit 
 
 Metasploit is an open-source security vulnerability scanner. Metasploit is the most 
popular scanning tool according to a recent SecTools survey [18]. Metasploit is designed 
to enhance network security penetration testing audits. Metasploit was developed to 
produce an open-source tool for determining network security condition via vulnerability 
detection and analysis. Metasploit maintains its own database of vulnerabilities detected 
and exploited successfully. Metasploit is also popular due to it being a widely-
encompassing project, including a vulnerability scanner, and its sub-project, the 
Metasploit Framework, which is a popular framework for discovering new exploits, 
writing the code to exploit them, and then deploying the exploit. Newly discovered 
exploits are usually added to the Metasploit database, enhancing the utility of the 
database, since so many current professionals contribute to the database, and keep it up to 
date with the latest exploits being developed [17].  
 Metasploit detects vulnerabilities through simple signature matching of 
vulnerabilities to port scan results. Scanning results turns out ports which are vulnerable, 
and through the matching of these to the vulnerability list, signatures can be matched, and 
the vulnerability can be detected. Once vulnerabilities are detected, the resulting report 
details which vulnerabilities are present, in a large listing. The resulting scan can then be 
used to determine which machines to test with the exploiting framework, to see whether 
the vulnerability has been patched, even though the communication avenue is still open 
[19]. The resulting report delineates based upon host, and also contains detailed 
information about the host. Each host’s vulnerabilities are listed, with information about 
the specific identification of the vulnerability and when it was detected also listed [20]. 
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2.4.2 Nessus 
  
 Nessus is a proprietary scanner, developed by Tenable Network Security, and is a 
cross-platform signature-based scanner utilizing plugins as the basis for determining 
which vulnerabilities are present [13]. Nessus was originally an open-source project, 
which has now become monetized and enterprise-level software in many respects. The 
classic Nessus 2 engine and its predecessors are open-source via an open-source license 
allowing reproduction but not sale. The release was forked with the creation of Nessus 3, 
whereupon all new content will be sold, and is privately licensed, though plugin updates 
for Nessus 2 are still being released, allowing it to still be up to date in terms of which 
vulnerabilities are known, albeit the older Nessus 2 engine [14]. 
 Nessus scans the network first via a port-scan tool, designed to pick up which 
ports are open for communication to the device. Nessus has four different scanners 
available, and though some configuration, can alternatively use other existing scanners 
that are available on the internet [15] [16]. Nessus then utilizes exploits to attempt to 
exploit the vulnerabilities detected, in order to determine if the device really is vulnerable 
to the vulnerability. Nessus uses its proprietary NASL (Nessus Attack Script Language) 
to run these vulnerability checks. The definition of what attacks can be attempted, and 
what vulnerabilities are known, are updated on a weekly basis through what are known as 
“plugins.” Once a scan is run, and vulnerabilities are detected, it provides a large report 
of what was detected in a choice of a number of formats including plain text, XML, 
HTML, and more. The vulnerabilities are listed which were detected, and can then be 
searched or filtered in order to determine the network condition more finely. 
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2.4.3 Nmap 
 
 Nmap is a security scanner which attempts to map out a network and discover the 
clients and applications running on the network, in order to understand the network’s 
condition. In addition to this scanning, Nmap can do port scanning on clients, enabling a 
security analysis of the clients much like other scanners. Nmap can determine details 
about the hosts such as type of device, and presence of firewalls. Many other security 
tools use Nmap as their base in order to get the network condition [21]. Nmap is open 
source and cross-platform as well, enabling easy expansion and adaption of the tool to fit 
the needs of the user.  
 Nmap also has adaptive scanning, enabling what many tools do not; Nmap can 
scan a network much more successfully than other tools through careful scanning. Nmap 
has the ability to scan with attention paid to network latency, congestion, and even the 
target being resistant to the scans, in order to get a better scan on the network’s condition 
[23]. This scanning also enables Nmap to not be detected and stopped by other network 
security automated devices, which enhances Nmap’s effectiveness as compared to other 
simple scanning tools [22]. Nmap utilizes vulnerability databases as other tools do in 
order to match the open ports detected with known vulnerabilities, and stands out as the 
most directly useful network scanner for many projects. Nmap serves as the basis for 
many more complicated tools, in that its simple nature, and the structure of its 
implementation allows easy integration. 
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2.4.4 Audit Software Issues 
  
 All the audit software programs that have been described have common goals, 
and common issues, relating to the goals of this thesis’s research. The reports generated 
are more complex and detailed than can be easily understood in many cases, since the 
volume of data created is very large. Filtering or otherwise data mining the report is 
required in order to understand just what is going on in the network. Additionally, just the 
reports are given, which does not necessarily give a score for how severe the issues are 
on the system(s) in question. The goals of this thesis are to confront this issue, and 
produce a score which simplifies these reports, providing a uniquely simple network 
health metric. 
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CHAPTER 3: NIST’S COMPUTER SECURITY ASSETS 
 
 With the ever increasing demand for computer data security, and the rising risk to 
national assets associated with national data of critical importance being more at risk, the 
United States Government funded initiatives to create a national security asset (as shown 
in Figure 3.1 [38] ) capable of increasing the security on computer networks [24]. This 
security asset is concerned with increasing the level of security on government machines, 
overall hardening government computers and their integral data from outside attackers. 
Common security issues are catalogued, evaluated, and solutions generated for resolving 
the vulnerability and returning the machine to a more secure state. A strong degree of 
certification and professionalism in the identification and verification of the 
vulnerabilities and fixes within these databases was of paramount importance, in order to 
guarantee the usefulness of the database. By scanning a network, matching the network 
condition to the database and identifying network security issues this way, the research in 
this thesis intends to rate a computer network’s security health via nationally accredited 
security metrics. 
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Figure 3.1: NIST Security Assets 
 
 
3.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits – CVE 
 
 The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits Database (CVE) is a concerted effort 
on the part of the MITRE Corporation, a non-profit organization managing national 
defense and research facilities, foundations, and projects [26]. CVE works to combine 
publicly known common vulnerabilities into one database, uniting the many 
commercially maintained, and publically contributed security vulnerability databases 
[25]. This central database allows each of the vulnerabilities to have one unique 
identifier, a CVE id, such as “CVE-2001-1723.” The use of unique identifiers reduces the 
complexity of the international security threat identification effort, in that there are fewer 
duplicate vulnerabilities circulating, enabling a cleaner, simpler network report to be 
generated. CVE serves as more of a dictionary of vulnerabilities than a database, with 
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each of the vulnerabilities listed and defined, but not explained to any great detail, nor 
solutions suggested, as in more advanced databases. CVE is a great and unique tool for 
centralizing vulnerability identification, and serves as a common-language for different 
security data sources and organizations. 
 
3.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System - CVSS 
 
 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework for 
providing a repeatable quantitative score for computer security vulnerabilities. The 
degree to which a security risk is presented based upon how severe the security 
vulnerability is, is reflected in the CVSS score [27]. Each of the vulnerabilities can be 
given a CVSS score through a review process in order to evaluate it by security 
professionals, and the vulnerability’s exploitations that have occurred in the past. In order 
to compare how severe each type of security vulnerability is to each other, we must 
evaluate them using a quantitative evaluation of them, such as CVSS provides. CVSS is 
unique as a scoring system, in terms of how reputable it is, and how wide-reaching its 
implementation has been, across many NIST supported security vulnerability assets. 
 CVSS utilizes a multi-faceted approach to scoring vulnerabilities. The final CVSS 
score is in fact a combination of the exploitability metrics and the impact metrics. The 
combination of these subscores yields the CVSS base score, which is utilized widely, and 
is independent of the situation, organization, network, and other variables in which the 
vulnerability may be present. The exploitability metrics are concerned with how the 
attacker will be able to access the machine with the vulnerability and how to exploit it. 
The complexity of the attack, the level of access needed to invoke the attack, and how 
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deep in the network the system exists (how deep the attacker would have to delve from 
the network’s entry point to exploit it), are all concerns. The impact metric is concerned 
with the CIA of the system. Is the vulnerability going to affect the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the data, or a composite of this? In order to include 
considerations about the specific situation where the vulnerability has manifest itself, 
CVSS allows use of the environmental and temporal sub scores, which increases the 
accuracy of the score, provided the network situation is properly known, in order to 
provide this information. The environmental subscore considers how much of an impact 
this vulnerability would have upon the organization, and how many systems on the 
network are vulnerable on the network. Additionally, modifications to the impact sub-
score are used, considering how much confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility is a 
concern. The temporal sub-score enables inclusion of situational data about the 
vulnerability in the wild per-se. Information about how long the vulnerability has been 
available openly (like released on the internet, and well known, for example), the types of 
fixes available to resolve the issue, and the level of validation that has been done to make 
sure the vulnerability exists, and is exploitable. Inclusion of this extra information makes 
the scores customized to your network, and they no longer apply to the worlds’ situation 
any longer. Only the base-score is network and situational independent, allowing a wider 
level of utilization [27]. 
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3.3 National Vulnerability Database – NVD 
 
 The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is one of NIST’s important security 
assets for determining the severity of computer security risks. NVD is the sum of many 
other security databases, and utilizes the CVSS scoring system, allowing the fullest 
utilization of available public computer security risk analysis, and quantification methods 
via CVSS scores [28]. NVD is also linked with CVE, enabling comparison and expansion 
of NVD with CVE entries. Expanding CVE entries to include references for where the 
vulnerability was found, how it might be fixed, and much more, is the role NVD plays on 
expanding security databases, rather than just being a superset of other databases and 
dictionaries. NVD is also part of NIST’s Information Security Automation Program 
(ISAP), which is a move towards enabling computer controlled security appliances and 
software to increase computer security through automatic resolution of existing and 
newly discovered vulnerabilities [29]. The CVSS scores from NVD, and identified 
vulnerability signatures in NVD entries allows for this automated approach. NVD is used 
as the primary resource for finding vulnerabilities and determining their comparative 
severity and impact. Using NVD’s information about the vulnerabilities, vulnerability 
signatures can be derived, enabling matching of network conditions to the extracted 
signatures, then matching to CVE IDs, and getting the CVSS base score from the NVD 
entries, scores can be acquired for each of the vulnerabilities which has been identified 
from the matching process. NVD provides a reputable, widely used, constantly updated, 
and openly available resource for basing this research upon. 
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3.4 NIST Security Asset Conclusions 
 
 While NIST’s security assets that have been described are useful to many 
researchers, they are more of a foundation to further research than a security appliance in 
their own. The databases and dictionaries enable security professionals and developers of 
security tools to consolidate the many different definitions of vulnerabilities, and get an 
idea of how severe given vulnerabilities are, but that is as far as these resources takes 
you. Many security appliances, like those mentioned in sections 2.4.1-3 go so far as to tie 
discovered vulnerabilities to their CVE entry numbers or pull the vulnerability 
information from NVD, but they do not attempt to profile the entire network situation as 
a single security environment. These tools profile each of the vulnerabilities separately, 
providing information relevant to the vulnerability, the threats present that may exploit it, 
and its status as exploitable, but provide no groundwork for profiling the entire network. 
The other security auditing tools we have looked at may list the severity of each of the 
vulnerabilities, but this research expands upon this by compositing multiple 
vulnerabilities’ scores into a machine’s total score, and further along as an entire 
network’s complete score. Compositing these scores into combined scores builds upon 
NIST’s security foundation that they have laid with these tools, and expands the 
functionality of these resources though providing another application for them, 
considering the entire machine, or the entire network, providing a larger security 
condition. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING NETWORK SECURITY 
 
 
 The new work of this thesis is concerned with defining the security “health” of a 
network, and generating a new metric for creating a composite, quantitative score which 
represents the health of a computer network’s security. The new system implemented in 
this thesis will provide a double value between 0 and 10 inclusive, in order to keep in line 
with NIST’s CVSS scoring system, to reflect the level of security or insecurity of a given 
network. A network of computers will be scanned with a port-scanning tool such as 
Nmap, determining which ports are open on machines in the network. Based upon the 
ports open, and matching to the NVD entries’ information about what situation describes 
a given single vulnerability, the certain security vulnerabilities which exist in a network 
can be determined. The security vulnerabilities detected are security exploits that may 
occur is a malicious agent exploits the vulnerability, meaning that the situation could be 
ripe for them to exploit the given machine, based on the condition detected on the 
network. Taking the list of vulnerabilities that the machines have, scores are retrieved 
from their respective NVD entries, and the scores are used as the basis for quantifying the 
network. The scores for each of the vulnerabilities are combined into a score for the given 
computer, and then the scores for all the computers are in turn combined into a single 
score for the entire network. This compositing is studied as the primary focus of the 
thesis, in that combining a network security report into a single quantified value, whilst 
still maintaining an accurate reflection of the network’s security situation is challenging. 
Three methods for this composition are proposed, demonstrated and compared, with the 
latter of the three being the result of experimentation and optimization of the compositing 
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technique. The resulting score will be from 0-10 inclusive, in-line with CVSS scores, 
with the most vulnerable networks (the least healthy) holding a score of 10, and the most 
secure networks (the most healthy), with a score of 0 to 3.9 being high health, 4.0-6.9 
being medium health, and 7.0-10.0 being low health. 
 
4.1 Approach 
 
 The approach for this thesis work is to find a way to simplify network security 
reports to a point where they are more accessible, and more easily digestible by more 
users. The complexity and length of the current reports is too long to make them directly 
useful. It makes filtering, data mining, or some other method for extracting information 
from the reports necessary in order to utilize them effectively. The reasoning behind this 
is that if the data remains hidden, or is not understandable by those in a position to do 
something about increasing security, the data may well never exist. Increasing the 
viability of the data has the effect of increasing security in this situation, since the hidden 
data becomes available. Gathering a network situation via network scans, then working 
the data via this thesis’s method garners a simpler representation of the network situation, 
enabling quicker, easier, and wider understanding of the network situation. A typical 
network vulnerability architecture is shown in Figure 4.1[37]. 
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Figure 4.1: Network Vulnerability Architecture 
 
 
 
 The thesis works as follows: first a network situation exists. This situation can be 
understood as a typical TCP switched network of many user machines connected to 
switches which are connected together behind some form of router which joins this local 
network to the wider network outside, usually the Internet. Typically a scan of security by 
a security administrator will be concerned with their internal network, the network behind 
this router. Utilizing a tool like Nmap, the research can scan the network to pick up which 
ports are open to communication on the machines within the network. Once the ports are 
detected, we know which communication ports may be used to exploit the machines on 
the network. In order to know just how the machines might be compromised, we consult 
with NVD in order to pull out known port vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities which are 
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identified as being port vulnerabilities are retrieved from NVD, and matched against the 
open ports on the machines within the target network. If a match is found, this means that 
the computer with the match may be exploitable via this vulnerability. The vulnerability 
is logged, and the rest of the network is checked over for vulnerabilities as well, until all 
possible matches are exhausted. Once the matches are found, the CVSS scores for each of 
the vulnerabilities are found, and are used in combining the scores into a composite score. 
 
4.2 Compositing Methods 
 
 In order to simplify the scores obtained from NVD for the vulnerabilities which 
the system has detected on the network machines, the scores must be combined in some 
way to get a final value. A method has been devised to get the composite score for all the 
vulnerabilities on each machine, which works as follows: 
 
 
Equation 1: Vulnerability Compositing Method 
 ( )                                          
 ( )    
 ( )
  ⁄   
 (          )   ∏ (  )
 
   
 
 (          )    (   (          ))               (1) 
 
 The method for combining the vulnerabilities into one score for the machine is 
found by first taking each of the vulnerabilities in turn, and getting their CVSS base 
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scores. The CVSS scores range from [0, 10] with the higher the worse security, we get 
this via the V(v) function. Next, the security function (S(v)) is applied to the score, 
rendering a score which is [0, 1], with the higher the better security. This number is 
utilized through generating the product of all these security scores from all the 
vulnerabilities, generating one composite number from [0,1], with the higher the better. 
This score is then converted back with the health function (H(v)) generating the final 
machine score, which matches the CVSS scoring method of [0-10] with 10 being least 
secure. 
 For compositing the machine scores into a final score for the entire network, 
many methods were tested, in order to get some comparative values, and determine the 
best way to composite these scores without losing information about the network security 
condition. The more accurate the final score is, the better, so having a final score that 
reflects very accurately the security situation in the network is the primary goal. To this 
end, the best of these compositing methods were experimented with, and provide some 
perspective on the efficacy of the last solution described, which appears to be the most 
accurate. 
 
4.2.1 Linear Compositing 
 
 Linear compositing of the scores is the most straight forward approach, so this 
was tried first to get a baseline for the research. Obtaining the scores from NVD for each 
of the vulnerabilities, the scores were combined, giving a composite score for the entire 
network after each machine was composited via the vulnerability composting method 
from Equation 1. The compositing method for the linear compositing method is to take 
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the sum of the client scores in the network we generated before, and divide by the 
number of clients, giving the mathematical mean. This straight forward approach treats 
all computers equally. The compositing is computed as follows: for clients C from 
{        } we have: 
 
Equation 2: Linear Compositing Method 
 ( )                                                       
   (          )  ∑  
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    (2) 
 
 Issues with this approach are as follows. Firstly, the approach is perhaps too equal 
with its treatment of the clients. With many clients of the same composite scores, the 
network may get a score close to that of all the vulnerabilities. For example, if the 
machine had ten or more vulnerabilities which were all 2.5, the final score for the 
network would be 2.5. This does not truthfully reflect the security level on the network, 
in that the network, which has a large numberof vulnerable machines, is really more 
vulnerable than 2.5 , in that there are more ways to exploit the network than were the 
network to have just a single vulnerable client with a CVSS score of 2.5. This bit of 
information is lost when this linear compositing is done on these situations. Additionally, 
this same problem can perhaps hide severe issues. Were a network to have a number of 
weakly vulnerable clients, and a single critically severe security risk client, the severely 
vulnerable client may be obscured somewhat in the final score, since the score will be 
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driven down from the level of the one vulnerability.With a network that contains a client 
score of 8.5 and other clients with lower scores, the net score will be less than 8.5 
because the average will be brought down by the lower scores.The resulting score from 
the method can end up lower if a network has many low risk vulnerabilities than if a 
network does not, since the high score will not be reduced. This can cause issues with the 
accuracy of the score in situations where the numbers of vulnerable machines are not 
roughly equal.  In light of these issues, linear compositing is not the best method to get an 
accurate picture of the network security condition. 
 
4.2.2 Weighted Non-Role Based Compositing 
 
 The weighted non-role based compositing method is the second method which is 
proposed and tested. This method is similar to the vulnerability compositing method 
utilized on each machine. This method confronts the problem of less important 
vulnerabilities of lesser scoring severity than the more severe scores causing the score to 
be drawn down. This scoring method allows each machine to add the collective scoring, 
without reduction based on a score being lower. This method allows for the severity of 
the security vulnerability level on the network to increase as the quantity of the 
vulnerabilities in relation to the size of the network to increase. The product of the client 
scores is generated, resulting in a more accurate image of what the network situation is. 
The composite is generated as follows: 
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Equation 3: Weighted Non-Role Based Compositing Method 
 ( )                                                           
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 This method addresses the issues encountered with the linear compositing method 
by taking into account the quantity the vulnerable clients on the network. This is 
confronted in the last compositing method. This method does take into account that more 
important vulnerabilities affect the composite score more, which is an important 
improvement over the linear compositing method, in that the scores are not reduced too 
much by less severely vulnerable clients. A score generated by this method  represents 
the network situation more accurately, but it can be tweaked in order to generate even 
better results, which is what the final method, the role-based method demonstrates. 
 
4.2.3 Weighted Role-Based Compositing Method 
 
 The weighted role-based combination is conducted via giving the members of the 
network different weightings based on how critical they are on the network. For example, 
if a machine has the access rights to the other machines on the network, or serve some 
sort of administrative role which allows the machine to have special privileges over the 
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other machines, the machine will be given a higher weighting than other, less critical 
machines. This increased weight of the score on this machine allows the machine to be 
given a greater impact on the total score for the machine and the network at each level of 
the compositing process. The score can be adapted based on how critical the machine is, 
and allows for greater control of the network setup information. With this additional 
information about which machines are critical in the network, the situation is more 
accurately represented than when this information is absent. This weighting is a means to 
enhance the level of information in the network situation. This compositing is conducted 
as follows: 
 
Equation 4: Weighted Role-Based Compositing Method 
 ( )                                                           
P(c)  Importance Rating for Client (Exponent for Client’s Score) 
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 This compositing is similar to the weighted non-role based compositing method, 
save for the exponent applied to the client score. This exponent effectively increases the 
influence that the particular client with a higher importance score (higher exponent) has 
on the network’s score overall. More important clients on the network will have a higher 
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weight, as appropriate to the importance of the client, with scores from 1-5 being the 
tested paradigm. Ultra critical members are assigned an importance exponent of at most 
5, with this being an extreme case, where even moderate vulnerabilities on this client may 
have extreme effects on the final score. Most clients in typical networks are assigned the 
standard importance of 1, which does not affect their score contribution. This weighting 
can be fine-tuned by administrators in order to get a better feel for the network situation, 
and can be updated to increase the accuracy of the network quantification. This method 
provides the best results in the experimental results shown in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5: SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
 
 
 Within this section of the thesis, discussion of how the algorithms and framework 
for quantifying the network were implemented will be provided. General approaches for 
the problems encountered, as well as specifics about the implementation details will be 
discussed, though code will not. Please refer to the code listings for code-level 
implementation details. The system was implemented in JAVA, utilizing JDK 1.7, and 
only Sun JAVA native libraries (no extraneous expansion libraries).  
 
5.1 Framework Overview 
 
 The framework for the implementation of the algorithms is as follows: Several 
classes were developed to represent the network situation and to quantify the network’s 
security situation. The problems of creating this system were overcome in several steps, 
with each being integrated into a central framework. The framework is a collection of 
classes which compartmentalize the functionality of the algorithm and enable the code to 
be very modular. The collection of classes is called together through static method calls 
to enable the full functionality for testing. Integration with NVD and the quantification 
algorithms themselves are called together through the framework of classes. 
 
5.2 Inputs and Format 
 
 The input for the quantification is in several pieces. The first piece is a file which 
lists all the NVD database shards which are to be used by the system to find port 
vulnerabilities to detect. This file is a simple one entry per line text file which is picked 
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up by the NVD Parser class, which extracts data though data mining techniques from 
these large NVD files. NVD makes the entries for NVD available through a set of large 
XML files, with their own special tag set, with one file being released each year, and a 
running-total file of the new vulnerabilities for the partial calendar year in progress (the 
modified entry in the set). The NVD shards can be downloaded directly from their 
website [30]. The entries, within their XML tags, allow easy extraction through data 
mining techniques. Each of these NVD shards is also to be made available to the software 
on the local machine. 
 The next input for the system is the network scan. The scan, such as Nmap 
generates, must be included in the system’s format for the system to process. The scan 
itself contains the information about the network condition, as scanned by the network 
port scanner. The open communication ports on the client machines on the network are 
listed, as well as identified by the IP address of the client. The system also supports 
weighted combinations, so the respective importance factor of the clients in the network 
are also part of the input file, and can be edited to increase the accuracy of the report, if 
necessary. This scan is formatted in such a way that the software understands the entries. 
Scans from various software platforms for network scanning can be adapted to the 
required format through adaption classes in the platform, and more adaptors can be 
written to expand the tool’s functionality. 
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5.3 Processing Inputs 
 
 Processing of the input files conducted as described here. The processing of the 
NVD source files, which are in XML format is done by first optimizing the file for our 
mining. Initially the files are formatted without whitespace, and have many tags to 
separate the sections. In order to easy data mining, the tags brackets (“<” and “>”) are 
removed and replaced with spaces, effectively space-delimiting the file for mining. The 
now space-delimited file is then mined for each entry, and each entry is identified 
whether it is port vulnerability or not. The vulnerabilities which are not are discarded, 
whilst the ones which are port vulnerabilities, are stored in the output file, which 
ultimately is the input for the NVD Matching class. The entries are mined through 
detection of the start tag for each entry. Each entry has a CVE identifier number, which is 
stored to uniquely identify each of the vulnerabilities in the database, and also is marked 
with a unique tag in the file. The combination is detected, and the ID is stored. Next the 
CVSS base score is extracted through detection of the CVSS scoring section, and 
extraction via regular formatting of the entry. The score is stored for later use in scoring 
the machines and networks based on these CVSS scores. The description of the 
vulnerability is extracted, and mined itself, with the section being found via its summary 
tag. The section is mined for mentions of specific ports being used in the vulnerability, in 
that NVD lists port vulnerabilities with their exploited ports in their summary 
descriptions. If a port is found in this section, the entry is kept, and is deemed port 
vulnerability, and stored in the output file. After all of the entries are processed, the input 
processing is finished for the NVD source files. The NVD source is currently just over 
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48000 CVE entries [31], and is processed in a few minutes on an average performance, 
modern consumer laptop. 
  
5.4 Matching to NVD Entries 
 
 Determining which vulnerabilities are present on the network is done by matching 
up the condition of the machines on the network to the NVD entries describing the 
conditions required for a vulnerability to be present. As described in section 5.1.2, the 
system compares each machine’s condition to each vulnerability in the NVD entries used 
in this thesis, in order to determine which vulnerabilities are present.. The entries in this 
subset database have a number of communication ports associated with them, which must 
be open on the target machines in order to exploit the vulnerability on the machine. The 
system takes the network situation input file, which lists clients on the network via the 
unique identifier of their IP address, and the open ports on their machines, and matches 
these open ports to the ports required for the vulnerability to perhaps be present on the 
target machine. The ports which must be open for the vulnerability to be exploited are 
called the “vulnerability signature.” We search for a match between the signatures of 
each of the vulnerabilities on each machine in the network in turn, discovering which are 
present on the network. Once the vulnerabilities are detected, each client object in the 
system has a collection of unique vulnerabilities present on that machine, which in turn 
contains information about which CVE entry is detected, the CVSS base score for this 
vulnerability, and ancillary information such as the NVD description for the 
vulnerability. With this information discovered through this process of signature 
matching, the system is ready to score the machines and collective network. 
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5.5 Compositing and Scores Generation 
 
 Compositing of the CVSS scores for each of the vulnerabilities is conducted in 
several different ways in order to research the efficacy of different approaches, and 
ultimately was done to create the final role-based compositing method. Compositing via 
linear composition, weighted combination and the role-based compositing method were 
all implemented in order to develop an effective scoring quantification on a variety of 
systems in the experimental data later in this thesis. The details for the compositing 
methods are discussed below. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM 
 
 The experimental paradigm explored in this thesis is that of confirming the 
performance of the quantification algorithms via matching the scores to known 
vulnerable and so-called “patched” systems. In certain well-documented situations, 
vulnerabilities have been studied to a point where the setup required for the vulnerability 
to be exploited very successfully is known, and situations which fix this vulnerability are 
also known. Through exploration of a few such well documented examples, validation of 
the algorithms’ scores can take place, and be discussed. Comparison of scores from all of 
the compositing methods will be conducted in order to give comparative results based on 
each approach.  
 
6.1 Scenario One - Windows Systems Vulnerability 
 
 The first scenario which is considered is in the case of Windows operating system 
vulnerability, allowing remote attackers to assault TCP port 135 with malformed packets. 
This entry is listed under CVE-2006-3880 [32]. The topology for this experimental 
scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. These malformed packets are sent constantly (as fast as 
possible), and have random integers inserted into TCP headers, enabling the vulnerability 
on the machines, as the machine attempts to process the headers. This vulnerability, 
exploited on a network of computers running the Windows operating system can be 
potentially isolated from the outside world through this exploit. The exploit causes a 
denial-of-service on the client via an IP stack hang, making communication with the 
affected machine not possible. All windows machines which have port 135 open, and 
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have not been patched or upgraded to avoid this vulnerability are vulnerable to this 
attack. In effect, this vulnerability affects all vulnerable Windows machines equally, with 
no special relationship between the affected machines being created, though a critical 
service machine affected with this attack may stop serving its clients due to being 
unreachable, causing wide reaching issues, such as if the machine were a login-serving 
system. Were a serving machine exploited with this vulnerability, more machines would 
be affected, in that they would not be served their services by the machine since it is 
effectively cut off of the network. For these tables indicating the network present, a dash 
indicates no vulnerability present (such as the system only having one or zero 
vulnerabilities). 
 Table 6.1: Experimental Scenario 1 Details 
Client Name Client Role Importance Level Vulnerability 1 Vulnerability 2 
M1 Server 3 5.0 1.2 
M2 Client 2 5.0 2.1 
M3 Client 2 5.0 - 
M4 Non-Client 1 2.1 - 
M5 Non-Client 1 1.2 - 
M6 Non-Client 1 1.2 - 
M7 Non-Client 1 - - 
M8 Non-Client 1 - - 
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Figure 6.1: Experimental Scenario 1 Topology 
 
 The experimental setup for this experiment has several machines on the network 
with the vulnerability, and other machines which are not vulnerable. The scores are 
derived based upon applying the quantification framework that was written for this 
research on the model network, and comparing the security health scores resulting from 
the experiments. The situation involving the vulnerability, and then without the 
vulnerability are tested, for comparison as well, in that the network should be more 
vulnerable with the vulnerability than without it. The experimental results for this setup 
are shown in Table 6.1. 
  Linear compositing on the above situation yields a score of 1.962500 for the 
network, in that the scores are considered separately, with no correlation. The scores are 
reduced a bit due to a quarter of the network machines being completely secure. The 
average scores for the machines on the network is the resulting score, which reflects a 
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generally secure network, which is the reality, in that the worst vulnerability is 5.0 and 
the quantity of vulnerabilities is relatively low. 
 Weighted compositing yields a score of 4.581250, since the information about 
which machines are especially critical due to their client server role, and being vulnerable 
to the attack through the server being reflected in the weighting. The client is ranked as a 
high importance member, with clients being medium importance, and the unrelated 
network members being low importance. The score reflects several clients having a 5.0 
vulnerability, but still there being a few clients with very few to no vulnerabilities 
reduces the score a bit from the 5.0 of the experimental vulnerability. 
 The role-based compositing method yields a score of 7.056850, which more 
appropriately reflects the network condition. The quantity of higher severity 
vulnerabilities tips the score upwards. The larger vulnerabilities tend to help dominate the 
scoring, and as their quantity increases in relation to the total number of network 
members, they push the score upwards. The score reflects not only the importance of the 
machines on the network, but also increases the score above the base score of each 
machine, which reflects more realistically that the number of vulnerabilities on the 
network, the more vulnerable it is. The other compositing methods do not really reflect 
this. This method more accurately reflects the condition of the network with a score 
higher than the base of 5.0 from the experimental vulnerability.  
6.2 Scenario Two – Router Vulnerability 
  
 This experiment reflects CVE-2002-2159, which is a vulnerability on some 
Linksys (Cisco) routers, which allows remote backdoor access to administration and 
router control [33]. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to effectively control or 
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shut down network traffic via any controls that the router has available. Perhaps most 
severe is that the attacking agent may move clients to a “DMZ” role, meaning they are no 
longer behind any sort of firewall, traffic control, etc., that the router might otherwise 
provide. This exposes the selected client(s) to remote access from the wider network on 
the outside of the router’s served network. Attackers might also gain critical information 
about the clients through the router configurations, and the DHCP table, listing all clients 
served on the network. This silent exploitation of the network allows backdoor access 
until it is removed, which means a silent backdoor for agents exploiting this vulnerability, 
which may not go noticed for a very long time. The router itself is of critical importance 
on the network, and the clients served by the router are of medium vulnerability, in that 
they stand to be potentially security probed by the outside network, or the attackers 
manipulating the network via the router’s control. These clients may have local 
protection such as application firewalls or antivirus applications which can protect them 
from this exposure, but clients depending on the router for security will be completely 
exposed by a savvy attacker exploiting this vulnerability. For this experiment we will 
consider a network behind such a firewall, which exposes its clients to this potential 
threat. The topology for this experimental scenario is shown in Figure 6.2. The 
experimental setup for this scenario is as follows: 
 
Table 6.2: Experimental Scenario 2 Details 
Client Name Client Role Importance Level Vulnerability 1 Vulnerability 2 
M1 Router 3 8.0 - 
M2 Client 2 4.3 - 
M3 Client 2 1.2 2.1 
M4 Client 2 4.3 - 
M5 Client 2 5.0 - 
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Figure 6.2: Experimental Scenario 2 Topology 
 
 This setup demonstrates a situation where all clients on the network are 
potentially at risk due to a member of critical importance, with power over the other 
clients being compromised. The importance of the router as a security asset, and the 
critical nature of not allowing the router to be compromised, lends the importance of the 
router to be much higher than that of the clients. Though the router is of high importance 
through the vulnerability itself, the clients served by the router are also potentially at risk, 
raising their vulnerability level as well. This situation is characteristic of a highly 
vulnerable client-server interaction where the exploited server may compromise the 
clients via information garnering or service control (such as traffic manipulation, or 
denial of service). This situation is also important, in that the vulnerability is a quiet 
backdoor which may be manipulated for long periods of time without being detected, in 
that the backdoor is built into the code for the router’s software. The experimental results 
for this setup are shown in Table 6.2. 
 Linear compositing gleans a score of 5.419800, weighted non-role based 
compositing a score of 9.871254, and weighted role-based compositing a score of 
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9.994886. Compositing with the linear approach yields the average, which does not fully 
reflect the situation on the network, in that this score is less than the score of some of the 
vulnerabilities. The score loses its accuracy through averaging everything, and 
disregarding the frequency of appearance of the vulnerabilities so more vulnerabilities 
may actually yield a smaller score than a single vulnerability. This is the case here, where 
the total score across the machines is brought down from the 8.0 present on the router, 
due to the lower scoring machines which are less vulnerable. This reflects the problem 
with the linear compositing method. The weighted score is much more reasonable, in that 
it recognizes the importance of certain members of the network over the others. The 
router being so critical in this situation is recognized, and the severity of the problem, in 
that it affects all members of the network potentially is recognized as well, pushing 
scores up even more. The score is quite high via this realization, reflecting the severity of 
the situation, and fixing this vulnerability being such a driving concern in order to secure 
the network, which is at this point in the scenario, extremely vulnerable to this one 
vulnerability. The role-based compositing method provides a score a bit higher than the 
weighted compositing method, which reflects the quantity of scores present in the 
network, which the weighted score does not. The number of vulnerabilities on the 
machines raises the score a bit, since the more vulnerabilities, the more vulnerable the 
network is, since there are more points of entry, and more ways to exploit the machines 
on the network, via more vulnerabilities to exploit. These scores reflect a very vulnerable 
network, since very high severity vulnerability is located on the most critical machine in 
the network, and all clients on the network are served by the vulnerable machine, making 
them vulnerable in turn. This is a very insecure situation, and the score reflects this. 
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6.3 Scenario 3 – SQL Server Vulnerability 
 
 This vulnerability, which is CVE-2002-0649, is an exploitable vulnerability on 
SQL servers, allowing data manipulation on the databases being served [34]. This 
vulnerability can either cause denial of service on the server, or execution of inserted 
code on the server. The inserted code can do arbitrary things on the server, such as 
change rights, gain access to the machine, modify data stored in the databases, etc., 
making anyone served by these databases potentially at risk. Networks with SQL servers 
and clients are vulnerable to this. The machines which are clients are vulnerable, but 
quite so as the SQL server itself, and the non-clients present in the network, are for all 
intents not made more vulnerable via this vulnerability being exploited. Due to these 
roles, the SQL servers will be given a high importance, the clients a medium importance, 
and the non-clients a low importance to reflect this. The topology for this experimental 
scenario is shown in Figure 6.3. The experimental setup is as follows: 
 Table 6.3: Experimental Scenario 3 Details 
Client Name Client Role Importance Level Vulnerability 1 Vulnerability 2 
M1 Server 3 7.5 - 
M2 Client 2 4.3 - 
M3 Client 2 1.2 2.1 
M4 Non-Client 1 4.3 - 
M5 Non-Client 1 5.0 - 
M6 Non-Client 1 5.0 - 
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Figure 6.3: Experimental Scenario 3 Topology 
 
 
 The experimental setup shows a SQL server with the vulnerability discussed 
present on it. The machines which are listed as clients are the clients of this SQL server, 
which are somewhat vulnerable due to the exploit possible on the SQL server serving 
them. The machines which are not clients are not served, and are also not servers, making 
them independent members on the network, and though their vulnerabilities are a 
concern, they are not as vulnerable as the other machines, and do not contribute to the 
large-scale exploit which is possible over the nodes involved in the SQL group. The 
experimental results for this setup are shown in Table 6.3. 
 The linear compositing method provides a score of 5.2665, which is the average 
of the machines on the network. The score, as with the other scenarios, does not reflect 
the full situation on the network, in that it is blind to the importance of certain members 
over others, and cares not that higher level vulnerabilities on machines makes the 
network more vulnerable, but instead only shows that the average score on the network is 
less than 5 for the given setup. The weighted compositing method yields a score of 
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9.919534, which shows that the high importance of the critical member of the SQL server 
is shown as highly important, and brings the score very close to the maximum score, 
especially with the added scores of the medium importance clients to the SQL service. 
The role-based compositing method yields a score just higher than the weighted score, 
with a score of 9.963324. This score reflects that more vulnerable machines mean a 
worse score, which escapes the scoring systems of the other techniques. This score is 
more reflective of the severity of the situation, and again approaches the maximum score 
of 10 very closely, in that the situation on the network is very severely vulnerable. 
 
6.4 Real World Data – WKU’s Client Network 
  
 The techniques described were also applied to Western Kentucky University’s (WKU’s) 
user client network, in order to test the system on a real network. Nmap was utilized to scan the 
network and determine which ports were open on the client machines, and then the scan was 
processed with the processing framework code. The scan showed 11762 online clients, with a 
total of 262 vulnerabilities detected. WKU’s network is configured as a small group of routers, 
all connected to one another through redundant links, and then from these routers, a structure of 
switches serves the clients. This switch structure is a tree-shape with a main distribution switch 
being the first step from the router, and the switches for each building or area being served by the 
distribution switch. This building-wide switch then serves many switches within the building, 
which in turn serve the clients. This structure can be called a small star-graph of routers with 
trees of switches 3 or 4 layers deep extending from the router network.The worst of these was an 
8.0 vulnerability score. No machine was detected with more than one vulnerability, so the 
maximal client score was an 8.0. The composite network score garnered was a 5.061171 via 
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linear compositing, an 8.02572 via weighted non-role based compositing, and an 8.57161 via 
weighted role-based compositing, noting a few machines which are known administrator 
machines on the network as medium priority. These scores seem to accurately reflect the health 
of the network, with a machine score of 8.0 present, and many clients with some vulnerability 
present on it. With more information about critical machines a more accurate score might be 
possible.  
Table 6.4: Experimental Scores Table 
Experiment Linear Compositing Weighted Non-Role 
Based Compositing 
Weighted Role-
Based Compositing 
Scenario 1 1.9625 4.58125 7.05685 
Scenario 2 5.4198 9.871254 9.994886 
Scenario 3 5.2665 9.19534 9.963324 
WKU Data 5.061171 8.02572 8.57161 
 
  
53 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 In this section of the thesis, discussion of the efficacy of the methods employed to 
quantify the network and achieve the goals the thesis set out to achieve are conducted. 
The various methods employed to achieve this goal of reducing the complexity of the 
network health report is used, and the approach is discussed as well. Future work which 
goes beyond this thesis is mentioned, in that more work can be done regarding this goal 
and extending its functionality.  
 
7.1 Efficacy of Methods of Composition 
 
 The methods utilized to composite the scores for the individual machines on the 
network are discussed here in order to discuss what has been determined about 
shortcomings or strengths in the methods utilized. These methods each have their own 
instinctive reasoning behind creating them, and under analysis perform differently. The 
performance experienced under experimentation, and the observed behavior under 
different situations is discussed. 
 
7.1.1 Linear Compositing 
  
 Linear compositing is the most straight-forward of the approaches, and the 
simplest form of composition experimented with in this thesis. The average gives a very 
intuitive value for the health of the network, in that the total health of the network 
perhaps appears to be the average health of all its members. This approach does not take 
into account any of the extra information which is utilized in the more role-based 
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compositing methods. The end result of linear compositing is an average score, which 
intuitively seems to be a rational scoring method, but in practice breaks down quickly. 
The main issue with this method is that it simply does not reflect the security level on the 
network accurately, in that the more vulnerable clients present, the more severe the 
security threat to the network. With this method, the more vulnerable clients, potentially 
the more secure the network, if the averaging process is processing many low-severity 
threat clients, and one severe level threat. This would erode the high score garnered by 
the severe case, and result in a lower score for the entire network, which does not 
represent the situation accurately, since the more vulnerable clients, the more severe the 
network security threat. The average security level of each host is what the linear 
composite gives, which is not precisely what is wanted in this case, in that more 
information is known about the network situation, and this information will garner a 
better idea of the network health situation than this simple method.  
 
7.1.2 Weighted Compositing 
  
 The weighted compositing method allows for a more accurate picture to be drawn 
of the network, via each client contributing to the final score. This is effective, in that it 
allows the clients to each contribute to the final score without drawing down the final 
score with lower composite scores from more secure clients. This method more reflects 
the reality that the more vulnerable machines the more insecure the network is, even if 
the machines outnumber the more insecure individual clients. This method greatly 
increases the accuracy of the scoring for the system, with only the role-based compositing 
providing a more accurate indication of network health. 
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7.1.3 Weighted Role-Based Compositing 
 
 Weighted role-based compositing allows the compositing method to take in 
account more information known about the network situation, such as if a router or 
server, or its clients are vulnerable due to a particularly vulnerable client, and such 
situations as special application on particular machines controlling administrator access 
for example, can be modeled. Through control of the weights of the members of the 
network, precise control can be applied to the members of the network, allowing fine-
control of the network scenario on which the network quantification will be applied. 
Information about the network scenario known by network administrators can be used to 
adapt the model to more accurately reflect the network situation. This allows the method 
to be much more accurate in determining the severity of the network situation than the 
linear approach, raising the severity considerably whenever a situation which is made 
worse via certain members being of higher importance occurs. The method brings out 
much more information and a much more accurate score than the linear approach. This 
method can be made as accurate as the information about the importance of the individual 
members is understood and this information input into the system. Even with a mild 
understanding of the most critical network members, the compositing method works 
better than any other method tested. 
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7.2 Efficacy of Approach 
 
 The approach of trying to reduce the complexity of network reports into a single 
double value is an interesting question. The approach attempts to go nearly as far as one 
can go in terms of simplifying the value. A decimal value is much more efficient to 
understand, interpret, and otherwise handle than a large network report, but inevitably, 
some data will be lost about the specifics of the network situation. Through compositing 
down to such a level quantification is achieved though, which enables mathematical 
analysis of the network health, as opposed to reports which are merely a collection of 
data not so easily interpreted. This attempt at interpreting the information down to a 
single health score enables the ease of analysis and handling, but perhaps is not as 
detailed  a reporting factor than other methods of network condition analysis, but the 
system cannot be asked to be. Ease of interpretation and simplification are the strong 
suits of this system, and were the goals that drove the research, so in that respect this 
system achieves its goals. Full analysis of the data can occur at the report generation 
level, but for large scale analysis where data complexity reduction, or quantification is 
desired, this system achieves what is not achieved via other systems. 
 
7.3 Future Work 
 
 Additional work is possible with this system in order to enhance the accuracy of 
the system. Work relating to expanding the method for interpretation of the 
vulnerabilities to incorporate things such as expanded definitions for vulnerability 
signatures would enhance the detection of vulnerabilities. This work would enhance the 
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network situation identification via expanding the ability of the program to detect NVD 
and CVE vulnerabilities through matching other things such as detection of machine 
operating system, probing vulnerabilities, and other advanced vulnerability detection 
techniques utilized by larger scale network scanners. Any way to increase the accuracy of 
the network scenario which is interpreted for the quantification would enhance the 
accuracy of the score generated by the system. 
 In addition to increasing the accuracy of the scan to bring in more of the 
vulnerabilities present in the network, the system may be improved via more analysis of 
the interaction of the elements in the network. The current system does not take into 
account the situation of the network fully as it might were things like attack graphs 
considered for determining exactly how vulnerable certain machines are in consideration 
with other machines which are not so vulnerable due to the attack graph being longer or 
more indirect. This type of analysis would add another layer of accuracy to the value, 
enhancing the result. 
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